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“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…”
Prophecies, Horoscopes, and the Politics of the 
Paranormal in Serbia (–)
S R D J A  P A V L O V I C
It could be argued that, in any given society, the feelings of isolation (social, po-
litical or cultural) of a group and its members, and the helplessness that often 
derives from such isolation, can create and condition a paranoid-like percep-
tion not only of one’s own reality and immediate environment, but of the world 
as well. ͳrough a complicated web of causalities, such feelings can also gradu-
ally induce feelings of one’s particular importance, grandeur and generally su-
periority in regard to others, as well as a belief that the group in question is the 
subject of others’ hate, persecution and conspiracy. Such convictions are often 
employed in a community “under siege” as modes of explaining the state of 
affairs and are used for bringing together (preserving) goals and motivations 
of individuals, thus enhancing a sense of togetherness in the members of the 
group. Moreover, as the case of Serbia will show, they are employed as tools 
for rationalizing a political or economic crisis (or both), and for sustaining per-
sons in power. Such a way of thinking and perceiving the world, in turn, calls 
for and legitimizes (within its own narrowly defined sets of references) violent 
reactions against those perceived as the enemy. Given such modes of behavior 
and perceptions of reality, it is understandable why the diplomatic efforts of a 
third party towards easing the tensions between the contesting parties are usu-
ally doomed to failure. Such political mediation and crisis management repre-
sents, in most cases, an effort to find suitable solutions based on a pragmatic 
evaluation of the available options and an assessment of the consequences, but 
often does not take into account the particular character and construction of 
the problem itself.
Even though such patterns of behavior could be illustrated with numerous 
examples throughout the world and throughout history, we consider it impor-
tant to draw attention to the situation of modern day Serbia. Much has been 
written about the recent political developments in Serbia and the purpose of 
this essay is to shed some light upon an aspect of Serbia‘s political system and 
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its mechanisms of deception which has not received the attention it deserves. 
We will show a contemporary mechanism of deception used by the elite in Ser-
bia in order to rationalize the chaotic social conditions and preserve its author-
ity. ͳe multithemed character of this essay is an indication that the findings 
presented here are only an initial phase of research into a much broader topic. 
What then is this sinister and apparently effective mechanism? Nothing less 
than the use of occult, paranormal and prophetic themes by both the state-
controlled media and by some of the media that champions the cause of the 
opposition political parties. ͳese interpretative resources are used to explain 
everyday occurrences within Serbia, as well to interpret political and economic 
changes on a global scale. 
What makes this case interesting is not the fascination with the paranormal, 
with horoscopes, numerology, prophecies, and the occult among the general 
population in Serbia, but the efforts of the elite to sustain such infatuation. ͳe 
widespread popularity of the unknown and the other side of reality seem to be 
part of a carefully constructed mechanism of deception and control. 
Public opinion polls in Belgrade and in Serbia in general have become 
monthly occurrences over the last ten years or so. ͳese “general checkups” of 
the nation‘s health by various sociologists and psychologists have mostly been 
used to project the size of an electoral body and to indicate the political prefer-
ences of individuals. A study of this sort showed that the citizens of Belgrade 
and Serbia were generally in a negative psychological frame of mind. ͳe most 
common feelings expressed were those of fear, anticipation and disappoint-
ment. Some  of the citizens of Belgrade feared a civil war, while  were 
afraid of hunger in the future. ͳe same opinion poll concluded that some  
of the sample group felt constant fatigue and exhaustion,  were constantly 
nervous and angry, while  felt that they had had enough of everything. ͳe 
least number of complaints had to do with sleep and eating disorders. ͳe most 
common problems appeared to be fatigue, lack of energy and a lack of self-
confidence.
ͳese findings reflect a common theme in any society that has been through 
a stressful period of war or some other form of prolonged crisis. What is in-
triguing are the responses to the questions about individual beliefs in numerol-
ogy and astrology, prophecy and horoscopes, as well as in the inevitability of 
punishment (in the forms of an epidemic or a natural catastrophe) for NATO 
countries. Approximately  believed that events of cataclysmic proportions 
would take place in NATO countries, while  regarded the question as utter 
nonsense. ͳe level of education was a variable in the answers. For instance, 
 of those with an elementary school education believed in the doomsday 
scenario and the suffering of NATO countries, and no one discountered the 
possibility. Among university graduates,  expressed their firm belief that 
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some kind of punishment will be imposed upon NATO countries in the future 
(but by what or whose agency is unclear).
Furthermore, those who are believers and devoted practitioners of Eastern 
Orthodoxy have shown a greater inclination towards believing in supernatural 
phenomena than non-believers. ͳis might raise a different set of general ques-
tions about the nature of Eastern Orthodox religious practices among the Serbs 
and lend certain credibility to the theories of an incomplete or inadequate pro-
cess of Christianization of South Slavs. Moreover, an emphasis on the inclina-
tion towards occultism and superstition on the part of Eastern Orthodox South 
Slavs (in comparison to Catholic South Slavs) could be a convenient argument 
for those wishing to emphasize (and castigate) the oriental character of their 
culture and perception of reality, thus removing them from the European cul-
tural and political context all together. However, turning towards superstition 
and horoscopes in times of hardship is neither specific to the South Slavs, nor 
a characteristic solely of Eastern Orthodoxy, but rather a common reaction by 
people in times of crisis. It is, nevertheless, possible to argue over the means, 
levels and methods of its presentation within any given society. 
Naturally, one could also say that such beliefs are the result of frustration 
and hopelessness that, in turn, creates the need to employ the tools of supersti-
tion in order to ease anxiety. One could expect people to act angrily and in an 
irrational fashion after so many lost battles and broken dreams, as is the case 
with Serbia and its people. A vengeful attitude towards NATO countries is to be 
expected and is easily explainable. What should be kept in mind here is the fact 
that the elite in Serbia has an instrumental role in nourishing such attitudes. 
On a more general note, as theorists of the authoritarian state (eg. Adorno, et 
al.) have pointed out, superstition is considered to be one of the generic com-
ponents of the authoritarian personality, which derives from the need of an in-
dividual to ascribe responsibility to external agents that he/she cannot control 
in any way. To fully grasp the significance of this calculated irrationality in Ser-
bia and to analyze its impact on the population, we should address the issue of 
the government‘s involvement in advocating, endorsing and manipulating such 
a perception of reality. 
Keeping in mind the authoritarian character of the government and the fact 
that the Serbian public sphere is entirely controlled by it, and judging by the 
type of literature produced in Serbia these days, and the fact that the market 
is flooded with books on “formulas of light,” prophecies, horoscopes, numerol-
ogy and conspiracy theories, one would readily suspect the involvement of the 
state apparatus in all this. Various healers and prophets are constant features 
on almost every TV show and it is difficult to find a newspaper or a magazine in 
Serbia that does not have a section with horoscopes. Moreover, there are spe-
cialized magazines devoted to occultism and the paranormal, such as Trece 
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Oko (ͳe ͳird Eye), Tajne (Secrets), Sesto Culo (ͳe Sixth Sense), Cudo (Mir-
acle), Zona Sumraka (Twilight Zone), Nostradamus (Nostradamus), Horoskop 
(Horoscope)…
ͳis flourishing market can also be explained in a less dramatic fashion. 
One could argue that these magazines were designed as a form of entertain-
ment and a way of escaping the gloomy reality of everyday existence. Moreover, 
they could be viewed as a counterbalance to the all-encompassing and constant 
politicization of Serbian society. Furthermore, the attraction of the supernatu-
ral and paranormal, and of literature devoted to these subjects, could be seen as 
a marginal activity, as an insignificant segment of the publishing industry and 
its market in Serbia. ͳis argument is particularly appealing if one favors the 
view that the state apparatus and the party in power is busy battling its political 
opponents and, thus, not likely to devote much time and energy to regulating 
the publishing activities of such fringe groups. Both arguments imply that the 
population is being manipulated by the sources and powers that reside outside 
of the system and that the system, once relieved of the pressure of everyday po-
litical and economic struggle, will deal effectively with these issues. 
One might agree with the view that literature of this kind is a convenient 
way of escaping the reality of a devastated country, especially if such a view re-
fers to individual members of a group and their need to transcend the profan-
ity of their everyday existence in an unconscious and collective way. However, 
the falsity of these claims about its non-political content and fringe character 
can be easily detected upon closer examination. First, what is apparent from 
the pages of these magazines is the dominance of political themes and content. 
To illustrate this point, we will mention a handful of titles such as “Program-
ming the Brain in American Schools – ͳe Demonic Project of the American 
Government,” “ͳe Era of Aquarius and the New World Order,” and “Americans 
Admitted that their Army is Using Black Magic,” as well as “ͳe U.S. Govern-
ment Sold its Soul to Aliens in Order to Become the Only Superpower and 
Subdue Other Nations on the Planet,” and “Nemanjic Dynasty and the ͳird 
World War.” Moreover, these articles mention Serbian politicians more often 
than Serbian folk singers and other local celebrities. ͳe magazine Horoskop 
repeatedly publishes profiles of prominent political figures such as Slobodan 
Milosevic, Dobrica Cosic, Vojislav Seselj and many others. ͳe content of such 
publications performs the important political function of expressing, reinforc-
ing and canonizing a belief that the local power structure and its exponents are 
the true representatives of a Serb collective being.
ͳe strength of the argument about the peripheral nature of those publica-
tions and the lack of government influence on them is somewhat diminished if 
we know that Trece Oko (ͳe ͳird Eye) is published by the government-con-
trolled Borba Inc. In turn, Borba Inc. was originally established and is funded 
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at present by the federal government of Yugoslavia. ͳe magazine Horoskop 
is published by Politika Inc., yet another government-funded and controlled 
publishing corporation. On the other hand, television shows featuring various 
prophets and astrologists are prime-time events on the state television and TV 
stations closely connected to the government of Serbia. At one point in early 
, the Belgrade daily Politika, in its supplement TV Revija (TV Review), be-
gan publishing photographs of a local healer and prophet, claiming that he was 
able to project positive energy through his printed image to readers who man-
aged to gather a substantial collection of his photos. 
Long before magazines such as Zona Sumraka (Twilight Zone) came into 
existence (), the biggest Serbian daily, Politika, introduced regular sections 
on astrology and Chinese horoscopes. In March of , the science editor of 
Politika organized (and his newspaper sponsored) a unique event in Belgrade – 
the transfer of mental images from the Russian city of Novosibirsk to Belgrade. 
ͳe same editor continued to cover similar issues, and in one of his articles 
claimed to have discovered an unusual scientific study that successfully solved a 
number of cases of alien abduction. At the beginning of , amidst the con-
stitutional, political and economic crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Politika be-
gan publishing a series of articles about the miracles of parapsychology in the 
former Soviet Union. While Slovenia was seceding from SFR Yugoslavia and 
Croatia was bracing itself for war, and while the politics of nationalism and 
populism were on the rise in Serbia, readers of Politika were presented with de-
tails of paranormal occurrences in the former Soviet Union. For example, the 
author of that series of articles claimed that the former General Secretary of the 
Soviet Union, Leonid Breznev, had died of some sort of telepathic aggression 
rather than of cancer. ͳere was also a lengthy and detailed description of the 
case of a “flying woman from Moscow.” ͳe connection between the paranor-
mal and politics finds its illustration in a story about Andrei Gromiko, the for-
mer Soviet Foreign Minister. According to Politika, every time someone would 
mention the name of Viktor Grishin as a potential candidate for the position of 
the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the flowers in Gromiko‘s 
office would begin to wilt. 
More recently, the editorial policy of Politika has changed and shifted to-
wards putting less emphasis on paranormal activities involving individuals and 
devoting more space to unveiling various conspiracies by Western historians 
and philosophers. A common theme in these articles is secretive groups that 
control the planet, and people who carry the “sign of beast,” as well as the magi-
cal significance of the numerical combination , that was, according to find-
ings by Politika, placed in the new EU passports. Conspiracy theories do not 
necessarily fall into the category of superstition but both spheres share certain 
common features. First, they both place an individual in the position of a help-
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less toy in the hands of mighty and invisible forces. Such positioning implies 
that the methodological apparatus of history, sociology or economics is insuf-
ficient for the analysis of one’s private situation. Only through the analysis of 
these mighty forces can one explain and rationalize one’s daily existence. It goes 
without saying that the only people who possess such analytical tools and are 
blessed with secret knowledge are experts in occultism and the paranormal. 
Second, the content and framework of conspiracy theories have many elements 
of pseudo-rational forms of thinking which, in turn, are the basis of supersti-
tion.
How are we to interpret the fact that the mainstream media in Serbia de-
votes so much time and space both to endorsing irrational modes of thinking 
and to actively encouraging them? It seems that such encouragement is based 
on the existing beliefs in superstition and the paranormal, and that the struc-
tures of power are taking advantage of that fact. One can argue that what we 
are seeing in Serbia today is the process of rehabilitating the imaginary at the 
expense of the rational and that such state-sanctioned rehabilitation is the di-
rect product of the economic, social, political and cultural crisis in the country. 
Manipulating a population that is already displaying a considerable attachment 
to supernatural mode of thinking seems to be a rather pragmatic move on the 
part of the elite. Moreover, such manipulation is not, in essence, based on co-
ercion and force, and does not provoke resistance within the population. It is 
relatively easy to fabricate a prophecy; one does not have to follow rules and 
regulations, nor are there any restrictions in that respect. ͳe truthfulness of 
prophecies (or the perception of it) is almost never questioned and debated af-
ter the designated deadline regardless of the actual outcome. Its acceptance by 
the general public depends entirely on the popularity and the media profile of 
the prophet. ͳe fact that a particular prophecy, its message and the messenger 
are being presented through and endorsed by the state-controlled media lends 
them a certain credibility. Visions of the future and prophecies are far removed 
from any factual base and that characteristic might be where their strength lies. 
ͳe further removed a prophecy is from the social context, the more credible 
it becomes. Furthermore, a prophet is perceived as a medium that only conveys 
a message initiated by an unknown (cosmic or divine) source. ͳe personal re-
sponsibility of the prophet is never an issue, since he/she is not perceived as the 
one who generates the message. If need be, the falsity of his/her claims can be 
easily explained by emphasizing the frailty and unreliability of human nature. 
It is possible to compare the role played by modern day prophets in Serbia with 
that of medieval sorcerers. Both were seen as mediums through whom a higher 
power spoke, and the truthfulness of their words was never questioned. More-
over, in the case of modern day Serbia, these extraordinary personalities are 
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thought to represent, and through their messages convey, the purest expression 
of the spirit of Serbhood. 
ͳe fact that in present day Serbia the entire mechanism for creating such 
an environment and controlling its structure is in the hands of those in power 
makes this transition towards the realm of irrationality less obvious and less 
traumatic for the average citizen. It seems that the structures of power in Ser-
bia went even a step further than merely promoting various prophets through 
the media. According to some reports in the local press, a number of those pre-
dicting the future via TV screens have been instructed not to say anything det-
rimental to the image of the party in power or its leaders. ͳere we may find 
the reason why in many prophecies broadcast or published in Serbia Slobodan 
Milosevic is seen as its president until the year .
ͳere is yet another element to the prophecies that more or less guarantees 
their acceptance by the general population – the relative value of their truthful-
ness. False predictions, in general, are not taken as a sign of fraud and lies but 
can be easily explained, again within a particular cognitive framework. Failure 
to predict the future correctly can be seen as the result of a loss of energy on 
the part of the prophet or as the product of some strange and unwanted psychic 
intervention from outside sources. On the other hand, one could say that a par-
ticular prediction has not been understood correctly and that the instructions 
given by the medium were misread. Furthermore, no matter how spectacular 
and wrong a particular prophecy might be, what turns it into sancta facta is 
the notion that the population has developed, in time and with the generous 
assistance of the ruling elite, rather significant short-time memory loss. In the 
process of lobotomizing the minds of the entire population of Serbia, those in 
power have managed to elevate the concept of short-term memory loss to the 
level of a virtue. 
Another method used for prolonging the state of detachment from reality 
and for ignoring the mistakes of the past has been the frequent replacement 
of visionaries and prophets. Every once in a while a new face appears on the 
TV screens and on the pages of newspapers. It is interesting to notice that such 
“substitute psychics” are called upon only in the time of an immediate crisis, 
and only when the existing psychic network proves to be grossly inaccurate in 
its predictions. ͳese replacements, however, must strictly correspond to par-
ticular rules and must conform to a clearly delineated field of action. Naturally, 
minor variations are acceptable but, in general, there cannot be any compro-
mise in regard to their social status, place of birth, and educational and cultural 
background. ͳey are representatives of a “common folk,” usually older (and 
predominantly male) peasants from the heartland of Serbia, whose education 
consists of their life experience and whose cultural background is closely inter-
woven with traditional Serbian culture. In other words, they are representatives 
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of that acclaimed “Slavic soul” – the people of simple means that are blessed 
with an uncommon gift. ͳey are perceived as being spiritually strong and in-
dependent because they draw their energy from that deep well of the pure and 
generous tradition of the Serbian collective being and announce their visions in 
a traditional manner using the language of the common people. One example 
of such a “substitute prophet” in Serbia is Grandfather Miloje, a prophet from 
the Morava valley. His profile closely corresponds to those just enumerated and 
despite the fact that none of his visions materialized in any way, his name still 
commands respect. Miloje’s prophecies were published in Belgrade in , and 
the book became an instant bestseller despite persistent rumors that its con-
tents were entirely constructed by its editor and that a man by the name of 
Miloje never really existed. Moreover, the prophecies published were out and 
out wrong. For example, Grandfather Miloje had predicted that Bill Clinton 
would die on May ,  and that former Russian president Boris Yeltsin 
would be defeated by Mikhail Gorbachev and would end up being assassinated. 
ͳe fascination with an allegedly fabricated text and with its allegedly non-exis-
tent author only proves the effectiveness of the use of archetypes in manipulat-
ing the public perception of reality. ͳe real purpose of introducing (or invent-
ing) Grandfather Miloje seems to be the need to legitimize the present rather 
than to call upon the past in order to predict the future. His authority as a 
prophet was needed to ultimately strengthen the charisma of Slobodan Milos-
evic, since Miloje had made specific references to the Serbian president and his 
role in shaping the future of his people. Miloje tells us that Milosevic “is the 
only one capable of battling the Devil,” and that “he must not fall from power 
under any circumstances.” 
Salman Rushdie, when talking about nationalism and its mechanism of re-
calling the past, makes mention of a “return to the absolutism of the pure.” In 
the case of modern day Serbia and its population’s attraction to the supernatu-
ral, those voices from the past, visions and fantasies that belong to the times 
when “there was no time yet” will ultimately have a negative impact on the 
mental health of the nation. ͳeir function is to displace an individual, at least 
temporarily, from the envelope of everyday life and to try and position him/her 
on the ethereal levels of an aesthetic existence. Such visions and fantasies make 
it less difficult for an individual to step out of his/her own reality of daily exis-
tence and cross the boundaries between two worlds: to inhabit that other real-
ity even for a brief moment. ͳe appeal of such a voyage is so strong that people 
live and re-live those special moments, waiting for them to happen again. ͳis 
is what constitutes the nostalgic feeling about the “good old days.” People in 
Serbia live in multiple universes while not being ready (or refusing) to recognize 
and battle the horrid conditions of their immediate political and economic en-
vironment. Occasional flashbacks of rational thinking only bring about feelings 
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of helplessness and hopelessness and that could, in time, amount to a particular 
kind of karmic overload that might result in an uncontrollable explosion. Such 
temporary awakenings only reinforce the feeling – as noted some time ago by 
a cynical (deluded) Danish prince – that our world is more than the stuff that 
dreams are made of. ͳe mysticism of geopolitics that is being carefully nour-
ished by the structures of power in Serbia can only produce further isolation, 
irrationality in dealing with the problems of everyday life, and the inability to 
project one’s aspirations in an objective manner. 
For now, the elite is able to control events and to carefully measure the oc-
casional injections of new miracles. Some say that the impact of numerology 
and astrology upon Serbian daily life is so forceful that the system feels secure 
at present, while claiming the right to maintain such security at any cost. It 
seems that a significant portion of the population in urban centers is organizing 
its daily schedules according to the advice provided in horoscopes, and that the 
government in Belgrade is conscious of this fact. For example, it has been noted 
that every astrological sign in the horoscope published in Politika on March 
, , carried the same message. People were advised to stay at home and 
spend time with their families rather than venture outside. March , , was 
the day on which mass political rallies took place in Belgrade, rallies which had 
been organized by the opposition parties and the student organizations. ͳat 
was the day known as “Picnic at Dedinje,” one of the most significant challenges 
to the power of Slobodan Milosevic during his regime. ͳat was also the day 
when people‘s hopes for political change and a better life in the future were 
running high. 
To use the horoscope section in the biggest daily in Serbia to utter threats 
in such a blatant way indicates two things. First, it shows how serious the chal-
lenge by the opposition was, since the government resorted to appealing to peo-
ple’s supernatural beliefs and their fears of the unknown. Second, it indicates 
how important these beliefs were in an unstable political climate and speaks of 
the government’s readiness and ability to manipulate those aspects of human 
life for its own benefit. Influencing the beliefs, feelings, and behavior of indi-
viduals seems to be the intended effect. As a rule, prognoses for the future are 
bright and always encourage supporting the regime. On several occasions, read-
ers have been presented with an abbreviated version of the scenario for achiev-
ing the centuries-old political dream of Greater Serbia:
Astrologist Soka from Vukovar spoke yesterday. She said that the Republic of Srpska 
Krajina will cease to exist as an independent state because it will become a part of the 
union of Serbian states whose capital will be in Ohrid! That big new state will be a mon-
archy and its monarch will come from the Nemanjic family. In the future, the world will 
call this war a world war, and Croats will be of Eastern Orthodox faith, and will respect 
and celebrate, as the Serbs do, the family saint.
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What is important to notice here is the timing of this revelation and its source. 
ͳis vision of a future Serb state appeared in the Serbian press during the Lon-
don Peace Conference (May-December ), at a time when the popular sen-
timent in Serbia was that of an approaching victory on the battlefield, as well 
as of an imminent and favorable political settlement. Even Slobodan Milosevic, 
during his flight to London, remarked that the Serbs “are the winning party.” 
ͳe astrologist was a woman from Vukovar, a Croatian town that was obliter-
ated by Serb artillery and ethnically cleansed of its Croat population. ͳrough-
out the fighting over Vukovar and its surrounding areas, the Serbian propa-
ganda machine claimed the city and referred to it as ancient Serbian land. Such 
claims were partially based on the notion that the former SFR Yugoslavia was 
somehow a gift from the Serbs to other nations in the region and that they had 
the right to claim back their territory. Moreover, those claims reinforced the 
feeling that wherever Serbs live that territory should become a part of Greater 
Serbia. Such sentiments were clearly defined in a speech given by then presi-
dent of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic, during his brief visit to the front line with 
Croatia in late May . Among other things, Cosic stated that wherever there 
is a Serbian house and wherever there is a Serbian cemetery that will become 
Serbian land. Judging by this prophecy, Macedonia was also destined to be-
come a part of that new Serb kingdom. ͳe formation of this state was to be fol-
lowed by the conversion of all infidels to Eastern Orthodoxy, since that religious 
affiliation is perceived as the only true faith.
As ͳeodor W. Adorno indicated, constant exposure to this model of 
thought inevitably creates a special form of pseudo-rationality. In this context, 
astrology can be seen as a tool in promoting a totalitarian ideology. A decade-
long promotion of the paranormal and occult by the media in Serbia indicates 
constant and substantial dissolving of rationality. Prophets and people who per-
form miracles have replaced astrologists and parapsychologists, and even the 
quasi-scientific façade is slowly disappearing. Once induced, such a psychotic 
mode of thinking becomes the magnifying glass for assessing private life, the 
economy, history, social relations, international politics, etc.
ͳere are indications that those in power in Serbia are also susceptible to 
supernatural beliefs and one might argue that the popular fascination with the 
paranormal is not only and exclusively the result of  manipulative tactics. In the 
spring of , some senior members of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) political party 
established in Belgrade the Yugoslav Committee for Coherence and Invincibil-
ity. ͳe role of this committee was to work according to the instructions of 
Maharishi Mahesh on training some one thousand yoga-flyers to protect Yugo-
slavia with the power of their positive energy. Among the project’s many sup-
porters were the Yugoslav Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health. 
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It seems that the Yugoslav Ministry of Defense has been interested in proj-
ects of this nature for some time. In January , Serbian newspapers pub-
lished several articles dealing with this phenomenon. Journalists have alleged 
that in the early s the Yugoslav Army established Group , a secret or-
ganization that was to deal with the issues of psychological warfare and para-
normal activities. According to the report, this group consisted of various spe-
cialists for parapsychological phenomena, a number of high profile politicians, 
prophets, astrologists, intellectuals, opponents of the New World Order and a 
number of army officers. Further reports on the activities of this group ap-
peared on the pages of Zona Sumraka (Twilight Zone), where the author states 
that he has been cooperating with the group since . According to this ar-
ticle, Group  was formed as a section of the General Headquarters of the Yu-
goslav Army with the purpose of researching and eventually using new weap-
ons for defending the country. ͳe author tells us that the group was sending 
positive signals to the outside world from the very beginning of the Yugoslav 
crisis and pledging peace and cooperation. However, once attacked, these Yu-
goslav yoga-flyers fought valiantly against the intruders and emerged victori-
ous. Moreover, the group successfully used a special procedure called the “Ser-
bian Mirror.” Readers are given no details about the nature of the weapon itself 
other than that it had been based upon the past inventions by the Serbian-born 
physicist and inventor Nikola Tesla. ͳe practical results of the use of the 
“Serbian Mirror” were such that some of the enemy died (Turgut Ozal, Francois 
Mitterand, Yitzak Rabin), some lost members of their immediate family (former 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl lost his son, and the Czech president Havel 
lost his wife), while others got away with minor injuries (Bill Clinton only broke 
his leg). Speculations on the validity of claims made in the articles were put to 
rest in an interview with the spokesperson for the Yugoslav Army (VJ), Colonel 
Svetozar Radisic, that appeared in Politika. In this interview, Colonel Radisic 
refers to the use of the paranormal, black and white magic and the “Serbian 
Mirror,” as well as yoga-flyers, as a “multidimensional defense against the New 
World Order and a struggle that, besides the army, must encompass all state 
institutions.”
ͳis trend has continued more or less unchanged through the late s, 
and the end of the millennium has served as a convenient context for venturing 
further into the unknown and into the world of prophecies. More recent pre-
dictions were intended to have a soothing effect upon the population, as well 
as to reinforce Milosevic‘s grip on power. All predictions dealt with the current 
state of affairs in Serbia and closely corresponded with one other. For example, 
a certain grandmother Vuka predicted that Milosevic would stay in power while 
Clinton would “fall as a rotten pear” while another prophet, Zorka, stated that 
no one would be able to harm Milosevic and that Kosovo “will be ours again.” 
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Such rosy visions of the future were supported by yet another prophet, Vanga 
IV, who said that the KFOR troops would withdraw from Kosovo and that 
Serbia would be successfully ruled by “a group of wise people, including one 
woman.” 
ͳe usage of prophecies and prophets as tools in gaining and strengthening 
one‘s political status acquired a new dimension during the presidential election 
campaign in Serbia in the fall of . ͳis campaign indicated, among other 
things, that the ruling coalition in Serbia does not possess the exclusive right 
to rely on ingrained notions of superstition among the general population in 
order to gain the political upper hand. ͳe leaders of the opposition parties and 
some of the independent media (Danas daily, for example) have adopted the 
tried and true tactics of the ruling elite. ͳe new player in this field of dreams 
and fantasies is the Serbian Democratic Opposition. 
In the midst of the presidential campaign, the presidential candidate for the 
Serbian Democratic Oposition (DOS), Vojislav Kostunica, made a point of vis-
iting the village of Kremna, the birthplace of the late Tarabic brothers, well-
known Serbian prophets. His stay in Kremna featured prominently on the pages 
of several independent newspapers. Upon his arrival at Kremna, Kostunica was 
greeted by Jovan M. Tarabic, a descendant of famous prophets. “Welcome Mr. 
President! It was said that a man of the people would come and bring prosper-
ity, and that he would save our people from misery.” When asked who that 
man might be, Jovan M. Tarabic replied: “Mr. Kostunica, of course!” ͳe au-
thor of the report took it upon himself to describe not only Kostunica’s visit 
to the village, but to present his readers with a brief but effective historical ac-
count of the entire region. While praising the natural beauty of Kremna, the 
author repeatedly referred to it as the “Serbian Delphi” and as a place where 
people live long and prosperous lives. He even managed to incorporate into his 
narrative a part of the title of one of Milan Kundera’s books:
Fertile land. In the foothills of the mountain Tara, in a landscape so beautiful as if it has 
been created by a divine hand, lies hidden the village of Kremna. Shielded by pine trees. 
From every rock a mountain spring flows. People say that when the sun rises it does so 
first over Kremna and only then over the rest of the world… A snake-like dirt road leads 
to this Serbian Delphi, the homeland of Tarabici’s… Even though it might not seem that 
way, there are no miracles here. Here, human spirit and nature have been establishing a 
relation of mutual respect for centuries and have acquired the fine balance of ‘the light-
ness of being.’ 
Kostunica’s visit to Kremna was depicted as nothing short of a religious experi-
ence and as the ultimate confirmation by the late prophets’ descendant of Kos-
tunica’s worthiness to become the future president of Serbia. He traveled to 
Kremna to be embraced by a spiritual authority as the victor in the upcoming 
elections and as the savior of Serbia. However, his comments regarding the visit 
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and the treatment he got confirm the general attitude of the elite towards the 
other segments of Serbian society. Kostunica’s response to Tarabici’s enthusi-
asm was that “the upcoming elections are our last chance to save Serbia and 
we will make sure to do that. ͳese elections are not simple ones because only 
after the elections Serbia will show its real face.” ͳis entire episode could be 
analyzed within the category of the so-called “well-intended deception,” that is, 
a sophisticated, manipulative tactic used for centuries by many rulers and insti-
tutions (religious and civic) in order to gain the necessary support among the 
populace. Judging by the final results of such tactics in the past, it is not entirely 
clear how “well-intended” these deceptions have been. Similar suspicions could 
be cast upon the modern day Balkan version of Pia Fraus:
What is important to me is the fact that people in Serbia are ready for a change. They 
are determined to follow a new course and they know that what we need is a normal 
state. Anything that could help in this process is a good thing… I have great respect 
for the symbolic connection to one’s homeland but the most important thing is to be 
among your own people. 
Given the examples presented in this paper, one might wonder whether the 
population in Serbia has been the object of manipulation and mind games by 
the elites, or whether the representatives of the power structure believe in and 
are guided by the rules of the paranormal. ͳere is no definitive answer to this 
and one can only speculate. I am inclined to believe that the two options are 
not mutually exclusive but complement each other in an effort to preserve the 
status quo in Serbia. ͳe homology between the individual and the group in 
modern day Serbia only reinforces the idea of such a merger. ͳe ideological 
construction that is offered as an explanation of the political events, economic 
and social changes is analogous to the construction that tries to explain and ra-
tionalize those same occurrences on an individual level. Only by means of such 
a mental framework could an individual manage to rationalize the constructed 
image of the unjust and unprovoked punishment of Serbia and Yugoslavia by 
the international community. ͳe economic sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations are presented to the population as an event that has been initiated and 
conditioned by outside forces. Following the same logic, it has been suggested 
to the citizens of Serbia that their own personal life experience and future pros-
pects cannot be controlled, but are subject to various stellar occurrences and 
magical powers. It should be added that such a mode of thinking and frame of 
reference are, at the same time, a product of the reality of Serbia’s economic, 
political, social and cultural isolation. In an unprecedented environment of iso-
lation, paired with a series of lost military conflicts, it seems that the paranoid 
perception of the world is the main characteristic of public discourse in Serbia. 
To make matters more complex, such discourse is being constructed and ap-
plied in order to justify isolation through the reinforced notions of superiority 
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over others and hatred by the rest of the international community. ͳis dis-
course is present within both categories in Serbian society: those who are being 
manipulated and those who are manipulating.
It would be rather difficult to find an example of a modern government 
adopting similar practices in order to rationalize its own political and economic 
shortcomings in as open a way as is the case with the Serbian government. 
One could attempt to draw parallels with Nazi Germany and Hitler‘s fascina-
tion with the occult and the paranormal. However, such a connection could be 
made only on a superficial level and only in view of the principle of relativism 
that is shared by both systems of governing. Moreover, relativism as the philo-
sophical corollary to a particular nationalism is a common feature of nationalist 
movements around the world. ͳe case of Serbia is not an exception. It could 
further be argued that the basic defining element of its system of governing is 
fascist. Comparisons have also been made between Milosevic‘s regime and that 
of Mussolini. Ideological similarities aside, what makes the political system in 
Serbia unique among modern states is the extent to which the elite in Serbia 
creates, orchestrates and controls elements of new-age culture for its own pur-
poses. In Serbia today, one might argue, such a mechanism of deception has 
been fully adopted by mainstream society, and one is tempted to define the sys-
tem of governing in Serbia today as kind of new-age fascism. Naturally, one 
also finds evidence of numerology, occultism and prophetic themes in many 
cultures and societies in the West. ͳe difference, however, lies in the circum-
stances that nourish such popular beliefs, the manner in which they are em-
ployed and presented, and, above all, the fact that such sets of references exist 
on the far end of the periphery of Western cultures.
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